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INTRODUCTION 
International terrorism in relatively peaceful democracies like Canada is an 
unsettling affair. Among other effects, it causes casualties and damage, disrupts the 
routine of citizens, calls into question the adequacy of those bodies responsible for 
preventing, combating, and investigating terrorist groups and acts of terrorism,1 and 
provides fodder for opposition critics. 
Although the earliest act of international terrorism in Canada was the 
assassination of Member of Parliament Thomas D'Arcy McGee by Fenian separa-
tists in 1868, the country generally was spared this type of violence until almost a 
century later.2 Over the past three decades, however, Canada, like many Western 
countries, experienced a number of international terrorist events committed on its 
home soil. Most of these actions have been successful in capturing the attention of 
the Canadian public, the government, and the national security agencies. However, 
few academic studies of an empirical nature analyze political terrorism or any other 
type of political violence in Canada.3 
Partly in an attempt to remedy this state of affairs, partly because of a 
concern among Canadian politicians, policy makers and national security agen-
cies about the past, present, and future impact of terrorism on Canada, and largely 
as a result of the author's familiarity with Canada, he developed an original 
detailed, rigorous, comprehensive and publicly available chronology and data set 
on Canadian terrorist events. 
The original data collection project, titled Attributes of Terrorism in Canada 
(ATIC),4 was divided into three stages of data collection and analysis, and based on 
three types of terrorism: domestic (ATIC I), international (including transnational) 
(ATIC II), and state (ATIC III).5 The current version of the data base (amalgamated, 
revised, and labelled ATIC IV) includes 411 domestic events (88 percent) and 58 
international events (12 percent).6 Because the number of domestic events clearly 
outweigh the amount of international and state terrorist incidents, they were 
analyzed first. The international events have not been previously analyzed and thus 
are the subject of this article. 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Conceptual issues on terrorism fall under five general interrelated areas: past 
research on terrorism, geographical focus, definitional issues, typology clarifica-
tion, and international terrorism in particular. 
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Past Research on Terrorism 
The study of political terrorism in general, and in Canada in particular, 
involves a number of conceptual and methodological problems.7 These challenges 
aside, the majority of research on terrorism over the past quarter of a century has 
focused on what has been labelled international terrorism. This direction has been 
influenced by a number of factors, including media coverage of these events, the 
political agendas of governments, the availability of funding for research, and the 
development of large-scale data bases on this form of political behavior and crime. 
Moreover, regional studies of terrorism have concentrated on the more terrorism 
prone areas, such as the Middle East and Western Europe, while the more peaceful 
areas (North America, for example) have received less attention. 
Why Focus on International Terrorism in Canada? 
The decline of domestic terrorism in Canada since the mid 1970s,8 the 
occurrence of such dramatic acts as the bombing of the Air India jet (22 June 1985),9 
and the apprehension of actual or suspected "international" terrorists who were living 
in Canada or in transit,10 prompted a greater concern for knowledge on international 
terrorism. This concern stimulated two Canadian senate inquiries into terrorism," the 
revision of governmental policies, the restructuring of a crisis, command and control 
division of the Solicitor General department,12 and additional academic research.13 
Other issues make the study of the occurrence of terrorism in Canada an 
interesting case study. For example, Canada acts as a peacekeeper in areas of the 
world that have endured some border or internal war, and/or has maintained a low 
profile in those countries experiencing international terrorism. Although Canadi-
ans were subjected to terrorist attacks in those countries, it is not clear whether this 
type of violence has also transported itself to Canada. Additionally, Canada's 
immigration policies and practices were accused of indirectly facilitating the flow 
of terrorists into the country. Moreover, according to data collected by various 
bodies North America, including Canada, experienced a relatively low level of 
international terrorism. These statistics, however, generally do not separate the 
countries, preventing more detailed analysis of the Canadian experience of terror-
ism.14 Moreover, Canada shares the largest undefended border with the United 
States, the world's major target of international terrorism. 
Given the foregoing issues, as well as the similarities between Canada and 
the United States, it would be worthwhile to analyze the factors that make 
international terrorism in Canada less of a concern than it is for the USA.15 To this 
end, a data set on international terrorism in Canada might provide a variety of 
dependent variables that would help distinguish what attributes international 
terrorism demonstrates in countries such as Canada. Comparing the international 
terrorist events with the domestic ones should place the phenomenon of interna-
tional terrorism in a clearer perspective, particularly by clarifying typological 
differences. Finally, adequate data concerning international terrorism in Canada 
could help policy makers and those charged with monitoring or combating terrorism 
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to better understand the problem and to respond effectively, thereby preventing 
needless deaths, injuries, damage and overreaction. 
Definitional Issues 
For purposes of the chronology, data set, and this article, a definition of 
terrorism in general, of international terrorism in particular, and an acceptable 
typology is offered. A considerable debate exists about the acceptable definition of 
terrorism. After an exhaustive analysis of more than 100 expert definitions, Alex 
Schmid outlines twenty-two elements and develops a consensus definition consisting 
ostensibly of five parts. First, terrorism is a method of combat in which random or 
symbolic victims are targets of violence. Second, through previous use of violence 
or the credible threat of violence, other members ofthat group or class are put in a state 
of chronic fear. Third, the victimization of the target is considered extranormal by 
most observers, which, fourth, creates an audience beyond the target of terror. Fifth, 
the purpose of terrorism is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce 
disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (for 
example, a government) or targets of attention, such as public opinion.16 
This definition has some advantages: it encompasses terrorism by govern-
ments, by oppositions, and by domestic and international movements, and it helps 
to distinguish the action of one individual from that of the group in whose name it 
is carried out. That is, a person who commits a terrorist action is a terrorist, but 
people like him/her who are from the same group (race, class, nation, etc.) are not 
considered terrorists unless they engage in terrorist actions as defined above. 
With four qualifications, this conceptualization of terrorism suits the pur-
poses of this essay. First, not all five previously mentioned elements must exist for 
an action or campaign to be labelled terrorism. Second, while terrorism sometimes 
appears random in its targeting, it may be actually selective (for example, against 
certain races, classes, ethnic or religious groups). Third, violent attacks on 
symbolic material targets (statues, buildings, etc.) that have the essential traits and 
objects listed in the definition are also considered to be acts of terrorism. Fourth, 
only acts that have a political motive can justifiably be included. Conversely, those 
events that are mainly "criminal" in nature (monetary extortion for personal gain) 
or committed by mentally unbalanced people, where political motives are absent, 
are not included. 
Typology Clarification 
The study of terrorism can be further sharpened by delineating different 
types. Like the definition of terrorism itself, several typologies exist in the 
academic literature to classify terrorist actions. " One of the most popular and useful 
is the multidimensional typology developed by Edward Mickolus and adopted by 
others, which this researcher accepts for his purposes. Mickolus distinguishes 
among four general types of political terrorism based on whether an event involves 
government control or direction and direct involvement of nationals of more than 
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one state. He thus identifies four types of terrorism: interstate, international, state, 
and domestic.18 None of these types are, however, mutually exclusive in practice. 
For example, terrorist groups operating in a country may take part in both domestic 
and international terrorism. The Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapping 
of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montréal is a case in point. 
Moreover, all types of terrorism identified by Mickolus have occurred in Canada. 
A further specification can be made with the concept of international 
terrorism. Here it is defined as "those terrorist actions carried out by 
autonomous or state-controlled actors, affecting nationals, states or their 
property at home or abroad." Essentially, this combines definitions for 
international and transnational terrorism.19 More explicitly, for this research-
er's purposes, it includes acts of terrorism carried out by Canadians against 
foreign targets in Canada; foreigners against Canadian targets in Canada; and, 
foreigners against foreign targets in Canada. 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
How to study terrorism, what is studied, and the quality of this research vary 
over time and among investigators. The study of political terrorism in general, and 
in Canada in particular, is hampered by a number of methodological problems. 
These problems aside, there are several methodologies for empirically analyzing 
terrorism. One of the methods that gained popularity is the events data approach. 
Even though ample criticisms of this methodology with respect to its usage, 
purpose, and utility in political violence research has been articulated, this is 
probably the best available tool because it provides a comprehensive view of the 
scope of the phenomenon.20 
Statistical Compilations on International Terrorism in Canada 
The logical consequence of the scarcity of studies on political terrorism in 
Canada is that few statistical studies have been compiled.21 In general, efforts to 
collect data on terrorism in Canada can variously be criticized for their inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria, selections (events included and excluded), periods covered, 
methods for making statistical inferences, and methods for validating events. Thus 
what is needed is a data set that minimizes or eliminates these shortcomings. Apart 
from ameliorating the difficulties with the work of Anthony Kellert, Mickolus, 
Todd Sandler and Jean Murdock, coding of this author's original international 
events will allow reliable comparison between international and domestic events. 
This approach will help place the phenomenon of international terrorism relating to 
Canada in a broader context. 
ATICrV: How was it Created? 
The biggest hurdle in creating ATIC IV was the considerable amount of 
missing data. This is generally attributed to the difficulty in compiling the details 
of each incident, which is the most time consuming part of the research process. 
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To clean up this portion of the data set to allow for more meaningful interpreta-
tions. it was necessary to repeat the research process that was followed for the 
domestic data set." 
The three reference requirements, including one newspaper source from the 
city where the event took place,- and the fleshing out of the details of 70 possible 
events listed in the original master chronology were performed. After the informa-
tion was as complete as possible, each incident was reassessed to determine if it met 
the inclusion criteria. This permitted the author to classify events by two categories: 
those accepted and those rejected.-4 All incidents were recorded, paying extra 
attention to gathering information for cases that had missing data. In addition to the 
variables that were originally coded, a ne w variable was created to represent the city 
where the event took place. This will be useful when performing tests of spatial 
correlation, contagion, and diffusion. 
TABLE I 
Reasons Cases were omitted from ATIC IV 
Value Label 
Threat or Hoax 
Action took place outside of Canada 
Did not meet three source inclusion criteria 
Arrest of terrorist/s 
Frequency 
34 
33 
17 
13 
Personal/psychological and not political motives 9 
Protest and not terrorism 
Non activated conspiracy 
Insufficient details 
Criminal and not political motives 
Evidence of training 
Domestic and not international 
Target unclear 
Extortion 
Evidence of terrorist/s in transit 
State terrorism/intelligence operation 
Accidental detonation by terrorists 
Terrorists seeking asylum 
Wrong Date 
Total 
8 
7 
6 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
147 
Percent 
(23.1) 
(22.4) 
(13.7) 
(8.8) 
(6.1) 
(5.4) 
(4.8) 
(4.1) 
(2.7) 
(1-4) 
(1.4) 
(1.4) 
(1.4) 
(.7) 
(.7) 
(.7) 
(.7) 
(-7) 
100.00 
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Variable and value selection, and the creation of a coding form followed the 
conventions previously established by dûs author. Besides the additional variable, 
die methodology for analysis of international acts differed in two significant 
respects from the one used in the analysis of domestic terrorism. First, to minimize 
experimenter bias, all events were coded twice, on separate occasions, by the author 
and men by a research assistant. Second, when it was determined mat mere were 
insufficient details for inclusion of an event, a letter was drafted and sent to the 
appropriate police department exercising jurisdiction in mat matter, to the organi-
zation mat was attacked, or the victim(s) of the attack asking for additional 
information. Although me majority of written inquiries were not answered, dûs 
process helped to create a more rigorous data set man ATIC I and n. When me 
coding was provisionally completed, frequency distributions were run on all 
variables. This pointed out irregularities mat were caused in the coding process and 
helped to 'clean' the data. 
Selected variables from die international terrorism portion of the resultant 
data set (ATIC IV) were men compared with relevant variables from five data 
collection efforts. First, domestic and international variables from ATIC IV were 
compared. Second, ATIC IV was examined next to Kellett's latest chronology, 
coded by dûs author. Third, ATIC IV was compared widi die events occurring in 
Canada listed in ITERATE 4. And finally, ATIC IV was examined next to die State 
Department's yearly tallies of events. 
SELECTED TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST EVENTS EN CANADA 
Fourteen variables from the data set are explored in this article. The first five, 
die incident characteristics, refer to die timing, type, location, and targets of terrorist 
events.25 The balance refer to group responsibility, casualties from terrorism, and 
nationalities of victims. Although all of die variables have measurement difficulties 
they will not be discussed here. 
Annual Incidence 
Most studies of international or transnational terrorism indicate mat it 
increased steadily since data was first compiled starting with die year 1968.26 This 
pattern was not demonstrated in Canada, which consistently experienced a rela-
tively low level of international terrorism with one exception (See Figure 1 and 
Table 2). In 1968 tiiere was a total of 18 international terrorist events occurring in 
Canada, accounting for 31 percent of me total number of incidents in the 1960-90 
period. Odierwise, die attacks occurred in four waves. The first period, during die 
mid-1960s, consisted of events carried out by Croatian and Cuban nationalist 
organizations against Yugoslavian and Cuban government and commercial targets, 
respectively. In die late 1960s mere were die early manifestations of 'anti-
American' terrorism, generating die largest number of attacks in 1968. This loosely 
corresponds widi die height of die anti-Vietnam War protests in the USA. Interna-
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tional terrorism during the 1970s started with the FLQ kidnapping of Cross. This 
action was followed with attacks by Hungarian, Jewish, and Palestinian factions on 
Soviet, and Israeli or Jewish targets, respectively. Finally, in the late 1970s and first 
half of die 1980s, attacks were committed by Croatian and Armenian nationalists 
against Yugoslavian and Turkish targets, respectively. 
As Table 2 shows, there were a total of 58 international terrorist incidents in 
Canada between 1960 and 1990, with an average of 1.87 events occurring in any 
given year. Even though sophisticated statistical comparisons of die entire ATIC 
IV data set widi others are beyond die scope of tiiis article, some general observa-
tions can be made. First, although there appears to be more stability in the frequency 
of international terrorist events than in domestic ones, diere are also some parallels 
between die two, particularly in 1968.27 Two pairs of data sets showed die highest 
correlations: die international and domestic portions of ATIC IV; and, the domestic 
portion of ATIC IV and the US State Department's annual tally of international 
events.28 Although die former correlation may be a result of contagion or diffusion, 
it is difficult to speculate what might be happening between the international portion 
FIGURE I 
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TABLE 2 
Comparison of the frequency of terrorist events occurring each year in 
Canada among the various data sets 
DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL 
Year 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Total 
ATICI 
Freq. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
5 
18 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
3 
2 
4 
0 
0 
1 
4 
0 
1 
1 
0 
58 
(%) 
(0.0) 
(0.0) 
(0.0) 
(0.0) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(8.6) 
(31.0) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(5.2) 
(6.9) 
(1-7) 
(0.0) 
(1-7) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(0.0) 
(1.7) 
(5.2) 
(3.4) 
(6.9) 
(0.0) 
(0.0) 
(1.7) 
(6.9) 
(0.0) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(0.0) 
(100.0) 
ATIC IV[a] 
Freq. 
6 
41 
33 
25 
11 
13 
5 
7 
51 
40 
41 
36 
6 
5 
2 
3 
2 
2 
5 
5 
11 
24 
9 
15 
3 
4 
2 
0 
2 
1 
1 
411 
(%) 
(1.5) 
(10.1) 
(8.0) 
(6.1) 
(2.7) 
(3.2) 
(1.2) 
(1.7) 
(12.4) 
(9.7) 
(10.0) 
(8.8) 
(1.5) 
(1.2) 
(.5) 
(.7) 
(.5) 
(.5) 
(1.2) 
(1.2) 
(2.7) 
(5.8) 
(2.2) 
(3.6) 
(-7) 
(1.0) 
(.5) 
(0.0) 
(.5) 
(.2) 
(.2) 
(100.0) 
Kelle« 
1988 [b] 
Freq. 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
2 
1 
3 
0 
2 
2 
24 
Mickolus 
[c]& 
Mickolus 
et al. [d] 
Freq. 
2 
2 
6 
1 
2 
0 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
0 
31 
State 
Dept[e 
Freq. 
125 
193 
309 
264 
558 
345 
394 
382 
484 
455 
581 
462 
504 
497 
480 
487 
611 
792 
775 
835 
862 
528 
455 
11378 
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[a] Only claimed, reliably attributed, and inferred actions of the international 
events were included in ATIC IV. 
[b] Only the international actions labelled internal were included. 
[c] Based only on international actions occurring in Canada listed in Edward F. 
Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979 
(Westport, CO: Greenwood, 1980). 
[d] Based only on international actions occurring in Canada listed in Edward F. 
Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean Murdock, International Terrorism in the 
1980s: A Chronology of Events, Vol. 1, 1980-1983 and Vol. 2, 1984-1987 
(Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1989). 
[e] Based on total world-wide amounts cited in United States, Department of State, 
International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-1988, 3/6/91. 
of ATIC IV and the State Department statistics. Second, ATIC IV has more rigorous 
inclusion criteria than Kellert's 1988 chronology. Consequently, Kellert reports 
almost twice the number of events for the same time period (1968-85). Setting aside 
1968, with is multiple counting of coordinated events occurring on the same night 
but in different locations, then ATIC IV has approximately 60 percent more events 
than ATIC I. Also, ATIC IV has more events than the Canadian portion of 
INTERATE 4 for the same time period. Furthermore, ATIC IV and the events 
taking place in Canada listed in Kellert's and Mickolus' data sets are different from 
the world-wide pattern as evidenced by the State Department statistics.29 
Monthly Incidence 
Annual trends are but rough consolidations of more intricate processes. Are 
there periods during which we might expect a higher probability of attack? We find 
in Table 3 a clustering of events in September with January, April, October and 
November a distant second. Even though no comprehensive explanation can be 
given for this clustering, it is also possible that this pattern is the result of multiple 
coordinated operations on a world-wide basis (for example, mailings of scores of 
letter bombs in a given month, commemoration of specific events, etc.). For 
instance, some terrorist events that took place in September were attacks in 
commemoration of the forcible ousting of members of al-Fatah and the Popular 
Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) from Jordan in September 1970. 
Otherwise, there was an average of 4.73 events per month. Finally, a correlation of 
- .2127 was found between the month of international terrorism and domestic 
terrorism. 
Daily Incidence 
On the other hand, there is little, if any, clustering of the 58 international 
events throughout each month (see Table 4). If the events were randomly 
distributed, almost two events should have happened on any given day. In fact, 14 
events (24.1 percent) occurred on the 24th of a given month, while all other dates 
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TABLE 3 
Comparison of Month Event Took Place between 
International and Domestic events in ATIC IV 
Month International Domestic 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Missing data 
Total 
Freq. 
9 
1 
2 
5 
4 
1 
1 
4 
18 
5 
5 
3 
58 
Percent 
(15.5) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(8.6) 
(6.9) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(6.9) 
(31.0) 
(8.6) 
(8.6) 
(5.2) 
(100.0) 
Freq. 
31 
30 
22 
31 
56 
45 
41 
24 
29 
31 
39 
31 
1 
411 
Percent 
(7.5) 
(7.3) 
(5.4) 
(7.5) 
(13.6) 
(10.9) 
(10.0) 
(5.8) 
(7.1) 
(7.5) 
(9.5) 
(7.5) 
(0.2) 
(100.0) 
are a distant second in terms of ranking. This anomaly, as with the previous variable, 
may be explained by coordinated attacks. On die other hand, there is no parallel 
clustering of the domestic events. This observation is buttressed by the statistically 
insignificant correlation of 0.893 for the day of die month between the international 
and domestic data sets. 
Type 
Differing patterns also emerge for each type of terrorist incident (See Table 5). 
The majority of events were low-tech actions, requiring little sophistication 
(technical skill, access to equipment and logistic support, planning, personnel, 
intelligence and timing). Consistent with the pattern of domestic terrorism in 
Canada and world-wide, bombings account for the lion's share of all events (72.4 
percent). Since most bombs are easy to make and bombing attacks relatively easy 
to carry out, this pattern is scarcely surprising. However, the more sophisticated 
bombs, such as time-delayed and letter/parcel types, are underrepresented in die 
Canadian experience. 
Targets 
The bulk of die targets of international terrorist bombings in Canada were 
American corporations or die homes of corporate executives working for American 
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TABLE4 
Comparison of Day Event Took Place between 
International and Domestic events in ATIC IV 
Day of 
Month 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
International 
Freq. 
3 
1 
4 
2 
2 
0 
2 
0 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
2 
14 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
0 
Missing Data 
Total 58 
Percent 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(6.9) 
(3.4) 
(3.4) 
(3.4) 
(3.4) 
(1.7) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(24.1) 
(1.7) 
(5.2) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(1.7) 
100.00 
Domestic 
Freq. 
19 
18 
13 
11 
14 
15 
13 
12 
5 
14 
8 
10 
11 
14 
10 
16 
16 
5 
10 
19 
6 
18 
7 
12 
12 
9 
10 
13 
12 
21 
17 
21 
411 
Percent 
(4.6) 
(4.4) 
(3.2) 
(2.7) 
(3.4) 
(3.6) 
(3.2) 
(2.9) 
(1.2) 
(3.4) 
(1.9) 
(2.4) 
(2.7) 
(3.4) 
(2.4) 
(3.9) 
(3.9) 
(1.2) 
(2.4) 
(4.6) 
(1.5) 
(4.4) 
(1.7) 
(2.9) 
(2.9) 
(2.2) 
(2.4) 
(3.2) 
(2.9) 
(5.1) 
(4.1) 
(5.1) 
100.00 
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TABLES 
Comparison of Type of Terrorist Event between 
International and Domestic events in ATIC TV 
Type of Event 
Bombings [a] 
Unknown tupe 
Molotov 
Dynamite 
Letter/parcel 
Time-delayed 
Smoke 
Pipe 
Other attacks/actions 
Arson 
Seizure/occupation 
Armed Attack-missiles 
Skyjacking 
Takeover of non air 
means of Transport 
Destruction 
Sabotage 
Attacks on human targets 
Assassination/murder 
Assassination attempt 
Assault/slashing 
Kidnapping 
Missing data 
Total 
International 
Freq. Percent 
27 
6 
5 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
58 
(46.6) 
(10.3) 
(8.6) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(3.4) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(6.9) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
100.0 
Domestic 
Freq. 
218 
57 
28 
1 
14 
1 
3 
53 
3 
18 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
7 
411 
Percent 
(53.0) 
(3.9) 
(6.8) 
(.2) 
(3.4) 
(.2) 
(.7) 
(12.9) 
(.7) 
(4.4) 
(.2) 
(.7) 
(.2) 
(.5) 
(.2) 
(1.7) 
100.0 
[a] Does not include direct attacks on human targets. 
companies ( 17 actions). This is followed by attacks on Cuban-related targets (7) and 
on the US consulate (5). The remainder were directed against: Soviet interests (3), 
the Yugoslavian embassy (1) and consulate (1), and businesses owned by Yugosla-
vian-Canadians (2), the British High Commission (1), the Israeli embassy (1), 
Jewish businessmen (2), the Department of National Defence (1), the Turkish 
embassy (1), and a Croatian business (1). Physical targets received the majority of 
bombings, while people were die recipients of relatively few bomb attacks. 
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Direct attacks on human targets, such as assassinations or murders, (4 in 
all) were very rare in the context of international terrorism in Canada. But, as a 
percentage of the total number of events, they were almost 10 times as frequent 
as those caused by domestic terrorist actions. It appears then that the international 
terrorist events are directed more at human than non-human targets. Meanwhile, 
the number of kidnappings, hijackings, assaults and other actions are approxi-
mately equal in number and account for the balance of terrorist acts. This pattern 
contrasts with domestic terrorism where kidnapping ranks fourth, armed attacks 
rank fifth, and hijacks rank sixth. Surprisingly, although there were a handful of 
plane hijackings in Canada, only one qualifies as a terrorist act, namely die 
hijacking by Croatian nationalists of a Boeing 727, which made several stops 
including Montréal and Gander (11-12 September 1976). Most of die other 
hijackings were die activities of criminal or mentally unbalanced people and not 
political terrorist acts per se. 
There were no barricade/hostage situations between 1960-90. Of the events 
that could possibly be counted, one was actually a protest, which occurred during 
anodier type of incident (an assassination), and was clearly the secondary type of 
event. Alüiough there was only one kidnapping, mat of British diplomat James 
Cross by die FLQ in October 1970, mere were a number of attempted kidnappings. 
However, since tiiey were never realized, diese events were considered inactivated 
conspiracies and mus were not included in me data set. 
Locale: Province 
In increasing order of frequency die provinces of British Columbia, Québec 
and Ontario experienced the largest proportion of international terrorist attacks (See 
Table 6). Not surprisingly, international terrorist incidents occurred where die 
majority of Canadians, emigre and immigrant populations, live. Logically, a major 
reason why Ontario holds die number one position in international terrorist 
incidents is because of die plediora of targets: foreign consulates, embassies, and 
trade offices in Ottawa and Toronto. Additionally, die diree top provinces are well 
served by die news media. It follows dien mat die provinces which are not part of 
die mainstream - die maritimes, die prairies, and die northern territories - do not 
experience any international terrorism at all. 
Locale: City 
Cities where die events took place, are more revealing man provinces (See 
Table 7). It shows diat urban locales are die preferred locations for international 
terrorist events. These cities are chosen because diey provide a number of 
advantages.30 Most of diese cities in Canada have at least two daily newspapers, 
several radio stations and at least one television station. The most preferred cities 
appear to be Toronto and Montreal, which have die largest and second largest, 
populations in Canada respectively. Ottawa, where die majority of embassies and 
consulates are located and which has media of bom official languages, bad 
approximately two-diirds die number of attacks as die previously mentioned cities. 
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TABLE 6 
Comparison of Province Where Terrorist Action took Place 
between International and Domestic events in ATICIV 
International 
Province Freq. Percent 
Ontario 33 
Quebec 20 
British Columbia 5 
New Brunswick 
Alberta 
Manitoba 
Newfoundland 
Total 58 
(56.9) 
(34.5) 
(8.6) 
100.0 
Domestic 
Freq. 
23 
234 
146 
3 
1 
1 
1 
411 
Percent 
(5.6) 
(56.9) 
(36.1) 
(.7) 
(.2) 
(.2) 
(.2) 
100.0 
TABLE7 
City Where Terrorist Incident Took Place 
City 
Toronto (ON) 
Montréal (PQ) 
Ottawa (ON) 
Vancouver (BC) 
Quebec City (PQ) 
Surrey (BC) 
Missing data 
Total 
Freq. 
21 
19 
12 
3 
1 
1 
1 
58 
Percent 
(36.2) 
(32.8) 
(20.7) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
100.0 
Responsibility for Action 
Responsibility for terrorist actions can be analyzed by distinguishing among 
events that an organization claimed responsibility for, incidents that are popularly 
attributed by the media to particular groups, and those incidents that are authorita-
tively attributed to a particular group, by government sources or by inference, (for 
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TABLE 8 
Group Responsibility for Action 
Group Claimed by Popularly 
Anti-US Policy 
Cuban Nationalists [a] 
Croatian Nationalists [b] 
Armenian Nationalists [c] 
Palestinian Nationalists [d] 
Québec Separatists [e] 
JDL[f] 
CPC (Marxist-Leninist) 
Hungarian Nationalists [g] 
Direct Action 
Weather Underground 
Irish Republican Army 
RR/FLQ/QLF/ALQ 
ProFLN 
Direct Action 
Auid 
Front for the Liberation of 
Christian Lebanon 
Sikh Nationalist 
None 
Missing data 
Total 
group 
Freq. 
17 
7 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
12 
58 
believed 
responsible [h] 
Freq. 
19 
8 
7 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
58 
Authoritatively 
believed 
responsible [i] 
Freq. 
7 
8 
7 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
13 
58 
Percent 
(12.1) 
(13.8) 
(12.1) 
(6.9) 
(5.2) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(3.4) 
(22.4) 
100.00 
[a] Including Cuban Action, Cuban Nationalist Association, and Cuban Secret 
Government. 
[bj Including Ustasha. 
[c] Including Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and Armenian 
Revolutionary Army. 
[d] Including Black September. 
[e] Including the Front de Liberation du Québec. 
[f] Including splinter groups. 
[g] Including the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Association. 
[h] Based on media reports. 
[i] Based on police report or conviction. 
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example by choice of target, type of event, location, method of attack). Based on 
Table 8, groups claimed responsibility for 41 events (70.7 percent), 54 actions (93 
percent) were popularly attributed to identifiable organizations, and 45 (74 percent) 
incidents were authoritatively attributed to particular groups.31 According to Table 
8, eighteen different categories of groups or individuals either claimed responsibil-
ity, were popularly attributed, or authoritatively believed responsible for almost 80 
percent of the international terrorist acts in Canada. 
Of the events claimed by a group or individual, those opposed to US foreign 
policy were the most frequent. Distant seconds were the Cuban and Armenian 
nationalist groups. Most of the other groups or causes were ephemeral, their 
existence demonstrated by only one or two acts of violence over the thirty-one years 
accounted for in the data set. Furthermore, while some of the groups who claimed 
responsibility or whose responsibility was inferred were left-wing in orientation 
(for example, the FLQ), others, such as the anti-Castro Cubans, were not. One thing 
these groups had in common, however, was that the majority of them had their roots 
in nationalist and autonomist struggles, and thus could draw upon thriving emigre 
communities in Canada. 
Primary and Secondary Targets 
The bulk of primary targets were private property (28) events, followed by 
public property (17) and then people (12) (See Table 9). Specific targets that were 
most likely to be attacked were embassies/consulates (28 percent), residences (26 
percent), and people (20 percent). More than half of the targets were physical 
targets. Unlike domestic terrorism, international terrorism did not affect official 
Canadian targets, such as government buildings, postal facilities, and public 
utilities. For the majority of events, the information about secondary or incidental 
targets was missing or there were no secondary targets. Of the incidents that had 
complete information, residences, commercial property, and people were generally 
the main secondary targets. In general, people are three times more likely to be 
primary targets resulting from international terrorism than domestic attacks. 
Casualties 
In the thirty-one years covered by this data set, only four people were killed as 
a result of international terrorism in Canada (See Table 10). In other words, 
approximately seven percent of acts of terrorism ended in deaths to the victims. The 
individuals killed were of different national origin and occupations: one was a 
Canadian security guard killed during an assault on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa; 
another was a Turkish military attaché assassinated en route to work; one was a 
Rumanian official working in his country's consulate in Montréal; and the last was a 
prominent Yugoslavian doctor of Canadian citizenship living in Vancouver who was 
killed by the Ustasha. Unlike acts of domestic terrorism, no terrorists were killed in 
international terrorist attacks. As compared to other data sets listing deaths related to 
international terrorism, no corporation officials or prominent opinion leaders were 
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TABLE 9 
Primary and Secondary Targets of International Terrorism 
Target 
Private Property 
Residences [a] 
Commercial [b] 
Means of transportation 
Public Property 
Embassies/consulates 
Military buildings 
People [d] 
None 
Missing data 
Total 
Primary Target 
Freq. 
15 
9 
4 
16 
1 
12 
1 
58 
Percent 
(25.9) 
(15.5) 
(6.9) 
(27.6) 
(1-7) 
(20.7) 
(1.7) 
100.0 
Secondary Target 
Freq. 
4 
3 
1 
4 
31 
15 
58 
Percent 
(6.9) 
(5.2) 
(1.7) 
(8.6) 
(53.4) 
(20.7) 
100.0 
[a] Including homes, apartments, etc. 
[b] Including hotels, restaurants, construction sites, and miscellaneous offices. 
[c] Including installations. 
[d] Indicating people who were directly targeted. 
killed in international terrorist attacks in Canada. Although no terrorists were killed 
during these events, two Croats, suspected of engaging in terrorist actions, died while 
they were assembling a bomb in their home (1 September 1977). 
More dramatic were the statistics showing that 20 people were injured as a 
result of international terrorism in Canada. These injuries occurred in 34.4 percent 
of die events. In increasing order of frequency, the type of individuals injured 
included: those whose occupations could not be identified (1); workers/employees 
(4); security personnel (6); and government officials (9). In most cases, me people 
injured were not directly targeted but were hurt by fallen debris or shattered glass. 
These individuals were eidier at the wrong place at the wrong time or were 
responding to a bomb call. Also in most events where there were injuries only one 
person was hurt per event. And, in most cases of deaths and injuries, the cause was 
an assassination or assassination attempt. Finally, die majority of people attacked 
were of foreign and not of Canadian citizenship.32 
Nationalities of Victims 
Of die 58 incidents of international terrorism in Canada, 47 either had 
missing data or die nationality of the victim was not relevant. Of the remaining 11 
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TABLE 10 
Professions and Occupations of Casualties 
from International Terrorism 
Security personnel [b] 
Government officials 
Worker/Employee 
Professional 
Unidentified 
Total 
Freq. 
1 
2 
1 
4 
Killed 
Percent 
(25.0) 
(50.0) 
(25.0) 
100.0 
Injured [a] 
Freq. 
6 
9 
4 
1 
20 
Percent 
(30.0) 
(45.0) 
(20.0) 
(5.0) 
100.0 
[a] An injury which led to a death was counted as a killing and not an injury to 
avoid double counting. 
[b] Including military, police, security guards, and prison guards but Canadian 
citizens. 
TABLE 11 
Nationality of Victims from International Terrorism 
Canadian 
Turkey 
American 
USSR 
Rumanian 
Indian 
None/Not Relevant 
Missing data 
Total 
Freq. 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
43 
4 
58 
Percent 
(5.2) 
(3.4) 
(1.7) 
(1.7) 
(3.4) 
(3.4) 
(74.1) 
(6.9) 
100.0 
actions (19 percent), the majority were directed against foreign governments or 
emigre groups (See Table 11). Of the events where the nationalities of the victims 
were known, the lion's share were aimed at Turkish, Indian, and Rumanian 
government officials. On the other hand, only one-fifth of the terrorist acts were 
committed against purely Canadian targets - government and corporate officials. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Although the current effort is the most detailed publicly available data set on 
terrorism in Canada, like most data compilations, it is not without its problems; the 
largest of which is missing information. This drawback and possible methods for 
improvement aside, what have we learned or substantiated from this current data 
collection? What are some of its implications and applications; in particular, what 
could one reasonably expect the future of international terrorism in Canada to be 
like? The answers follow below. 
Correlational Comparisons 
With this measure derived from other data sets and data derived from 
chronologies of other researchers and organizations, correlations among ATICIV s 
domestic and international annual level of incidents produced unexpected results. 
Given that all data sets were designed to measure international terrorist events and as 
such should have been related, correlations among three of them, namely ATIC IV, 
Kellett's, and Mickolus et al.'s chronology were weak. Yet there was a strong 
negative correlation between the Canadian rate of domestic (ATIC I data) and 
international terrorism world-wide (the State Department data). But, within the ATIC 
data, mere was a strong positive correlation between international and domestic 
terrorism in Canada. In sum, although both types of terrorism in Canada were related, 
the majority of international terrorism in Canada was not significantly related to 
international terrorism which occurred in the world-wide geopolitical context. 
Changed Perceptions 
This study minimizes die perception, often articulated in definitions of 
terrorism, that terrorists are unpredictable, act randomly, and are indiscriminate in 
their choices of actions. As demonstrated, terrorists choose among a limited range 
of options. Second, this study determined the physical, temporal, and terrorist-
imposed boundaries where international terrorism in Canada takes place. Finally, 
the present analysis attached a statistical probability to diese choices, thereby 
helping to gauge the severity of me terrorist direat. 
Typology Clarification 
If we can generalize from the Canadian case to other similar Western 
democracies, international terrorism embodies more violent and deadly actions 
than does domestic terrorism. These international incidents are also primarily 
directed at human targets, kill more people man domestic terrorism, and take 
place more often in large cities and on days that commemorate other events. 
Reasons for the Low Level of International Terrorism 
When compared witii otiier Western countries, Canada experienced a rather 
low level of international terrorism.33 In many respects Ulis phenomenon is 
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connected to a larger process - the incidence of political violence in Canada. Five 
explanations specifically connected to international terrorism bear scrutiny. 
First, because Canada has an international posture as a "middle power," maintains 
a "peaceful" role in international affairs, and was generally on the periphery of 
important world issues (the arms race, Middle East conflicts and peace process), 
the country is not regarded by the world community as playing a sufficiently 
significant role in conflicts that produce high levels of international terrorism to 
justify its frequent targeting. The US, by contrast, is a readily identifiable target 
because of its global political and economic position, which explains why 
approximately 40 percent of all victims of international terrorist attacks between 
1968 and 1979 were Americans.34 
Second, Canada's physical location may have spared it some acts of 
terrorism. Kellert, and later reiterated by the first Kelly report, suggested that 
"Canada's relative remoteness from many of the conflicts that generate acts of 
international terrorism insulates it to a certain extent from the commission within 
its boundaries of such acts." He goes on to claim that "the great distances involved 
in crossing the Atlantic or the Pacific may have acted as a deterrent to extra-
hemispheric hijacking involving Canada."35 He toned down this assessment in his 
later report by stating that "[w]hile the distances involved in the trans-Atlantic 
route appear likely to continue for some time to discourage hijacking, air travel 
itself reduced Canada's insulation from the major terrorist 'hot spots' by making 
the country increasingly accessible from any point on the globe.36 
Third, an interesting finding from the omissions section of the chronology, 
which could account for the low level of terrorism, is the frequent apprehension 
of a number of real or suspected foreign terrorists present, if not active, in Canada. 
From 1960 to 1990 there were approximately 22 foreign terrorists who were either 
apprehended and/or deported from or refused entry into Canada. The greatest 
number of terrorists apprehended were those attempting to cross at border points 
during the 1976 Olympic Games. Groups whose members have attempted to 
cross borders or who were arrested in Canada include: the Japanese Red Army; 
Provisional Irish Republican Army; Baader-Meinhof Gang; Red Brigades; Gray 
Wolves; and Monteneros.37 
Fourth, the patterns of international terrorist activity in Canada were inter-
esting. International terrorist actions hovered around two events per year, and no 
sooner had one group stopped its campaign than it was replaced by another. One 
can infer from this that international terrorist acts committed in Canada by particular 
groups or individuals tended to be disconnected from each other. In other words, 
there is no evidence that any group or individual was conducting a systematic and 
consistent campaign of terrorism over a prolonged period of time. Of this sporadic 
terrorist activity, only the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA) and the anti-Castro terrorists engaged in a significantly higher than the 
average number of terrorist acts. 
Perhaps there is a normative and tolerable cultural level of international 
terrorism occurring in Canada. This hypothesis might be dismissed if it only took 
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into account the different cultural backgrounds of the people perpetrating the 
terrorist actions. It is more likely, however, that when actions of terrorism impinge 
on the Canadian "collective conscience" (in the Durkheimian sense) it forces 
Canada's national security agencies to become more vigilant in ferreting out 
potential acts of international terrorism and monitoring international terrorists 
operating in Canada. It is also possible that a substitution effect may have occurred. 
For example, when national security agencies focused on one group it provided 
opportunities for another to act.38 
Anti-Americanism and Criticism of US Foreign Policy 
The 17 incidents against American targets appear connected to US foreign 
policy issues and bear more detailed commentary. The majority of literature 
bearing on Canadian criticism of US foreign policy or anti-Americanism in 
Canada stops short of analyzing political behavior of a violent nature.39 Moreo-
ver, it suggests that anti-Americanism in Canada has an upper-class bias with the 
mass of the people more tolerant of American shortcomings. The majority of 
violent events linked opposition to US foreign policy during the 1960s were 
primarily related to the Vietnam War. These actions were carried out both by 
Canadians and by Americans living in Canada who avoided the draft. Apart from 
the June 1970 conspiracy by the FLQ to kidnap Harrison Burgess, the American 
Ambassador to Canada, which was uncovered and foiled by the police, none of 
the anti-American events were more serious than a fire-bombing. Moreover, most 
of the attacks were against American corporations that were building weapons for 
the war effort and not individuals. 
Future of International Terrorism in Canada 
Even though the overall rate of terrorism in Canada is relatively low, both the 
McDonald Commission and the first Kelly Committee predicted that international 
terrorism would continue to pose a threat to national security. According to the 
McDonald report, 
the internationalization of terrorist activities since the late 1960s 
has significantly increased the severity of this threat to the security 
of Canada ... [i]t would be rash to predict a disappearance of the 
'terrorist' threat in the future. Political fanaticism is not on the 
wane, and modern technology increases the power of a few to 
threaten the many.40 
Likewise, the Kelly report said that "[international [t]errorism is... likely to be for 
the foreseeable future the major source of terrorist incidents in Canada, at least in 
terms of severity and impact."41 
Although the Kelly Committee was more directed toward international 
terrorism than the McDonald Inquiry, neither of their reports adequately predicted 
future levels of terrorism. Roughly, three methodologies are relevant and should be 
explored in future predictive research: first, comprehensive modelling efforts that 
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include multivariate, time series, process and simulation analysis of events; second, 
in-depth case studies of groups/populations that are likely to engage in this type of 
behavior;42 and, third, tracking the rate of international terrorism in the US much 
better and comparing it to Canada. 
Future Research with ATICIV 
Now that both the domestic and international data sets are completed there 
are three possible research avenues that should be pursued: first, additional 
comparisons with other data sets; second, the analysis of causes; and finally, an 
examination of the effects of terrorism in Canada. Some additional questions that 
require answers concern the degree of government preoccupation with terrorism, 
public opinion, and the maintenance of this data set. 
First, ATIC IV should be more rigorously compared with other data sets and 
should be used in theory building and testing. This data set should also be compared 
with others currently available or being constructed. This leads to three meaningful 
comparisons/tests: with terrorism in other countries (employing both most similar 
and dissimilar research designs), with groups using terrorism in other countries, and 
among different types of terrorism in Canada. Furthermore, all types of terrorism 
should eventually be compared and interactions among them explored within and 
between countries.43 In addition, the author is searching for similar data sets for 
other Western countries with which to make further comparisons. 
Second, other opportunities for research include the exploration of other 
effects of terrorism on society as a whole, on the political context of the event (for 
example, on the party in power), and on policy responses. Generally referred to as 
impact studies, issues of public opinion could be examined in combination with the 
data generated. For instance, if international terrorism was of such low incidence 
in Canada, why was it the subject of so much governmental interest, particularly 
inspiring expensive, extended, governmental commissions, and inquiries? Moreo-
ver, what are the processes fuelling the fire of this phenomenon? 
More in-depth public opinion research clearly needs to be done.44 There 
needs to be ongoing monitoring of Canadians' perceptions about the seriousness 
of terrorism of all varieties in Canada, and how much their lives are affected by 
these events. This would help governmental decision-makers react more cau-
tiously rather than be subject to the whims of politicians and opinion makers 
rallying public support. 
Third, and most fruitful, is the exploration of the causes of terrorism. 
Having a reasonably reliable dependent variable (the number and type of "terror-
ist acts"), one could specify and test the independent variables that are related to 
the increase or decrease in terrorism.45 This research needs to be done on a 
continuous basis in order to be able to predict with a degree of confidence the 
occurrence of terrorist incidents. 
Furthermore, the existing data sets need to be updated and revised on an 
annual basis. Events added to the data set will help put the problems into a larger, 
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more comprehensive perspective.46 In addition, there are a number of other 
variables that with more forthcoming access to information and resources should be 
coded.47 Both of these hurdles are difficult for private researchers to overcome. 
In the final analysis, it is safe to say that Canada has been relatively 
untouched by international terrorism, even allowing for the possibility that not 
every terrorist act that occurred has been recorded. This reality brings into question 
the approach that should be taken to ensure that Canada's future terrorist track 
record remains relatively low. Continuing to harden targets, introducing anti-
terrorist legislation, meting out suffer penalties, and retaining the country ' s posture 
as a middle power in international politics represent a range of possible preventative 
measures. These strategies, however, must be balanced with the increased costs, the 
tendency for the number of laws to increase, the cluttering of the courts, overcrowd-
ing of prisons, and the potential for abuse and hence infringement of civil liberties. 
Although the Canadian experience of international terrorist activity is still of 
such a low level and sporadic pattern, that it hardly qualifies as an epidemic of any 
sort, it is still a social and policy problem. The disruption, repercussions, destruc-
tion, and loss of life that even a few incidents of terrorist activity can bring upon a 
state more than justifies the continued tracking of terrorist events and their 
attributes. Input now, rather than later, with respect to data quality, variable 
selection, and research applications, will undoubtedly make this work more 
productive and useful. 
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